Dr Gillian Craig (1) has argued that palliative medicine services have tended to adopt a policy of sedation without hydration, which under certain circumstances may be medically inappropriate, causative ofdeath and distressing to family andfriends. We welcome this opportunity to defend, with an important modification, the approach we proposed without substantive background argument in our original article (2). We maintain that slowing and eventual cessation oforal intake is a normal part of a natural dying process, that artificial hydration and alimentation (AHA) are notjustified unless thirst or hunger are present and cannot be relieved by other means, butfood andfluids for (natural) oral consumption should never be 'withdrawn'. The intention of this practice is not to alter the timing of an inevitable death, and sedation is not used, as has been alleged, to mask the effects of dehydration or starvation. The artificial provision ofhydration and alimentation is now widely accepted as medical treatment. We believe that arguments that it is not have led to confusion as to whether or not non-provision or withdrawal ofAHA constitutes a cause of death in law. Arguments that it is such a cause appear to be tenuously based on an extraordinary/ordinary categorisation of treatments by Kelly (3) which has subsequently been interpreted as prescriptive in a way quite inconsistent with the Catholic moral theological tradition from which the distinction is derived. The focus of ethical discourse on decisions at the end of life should be shifted to an analysis of care, needs, proportionality of medical interventions, and processes of communication.
Introduction
Dr Gillian Craig (1) has raised what she sees as serious concerns about the ethical and legal aspects of the practice of palliative medicine, with particular regard to the non-provision of artificial hydration and alimentation (AHA). We will argue that the ethical reasoning which we have developed to describe our
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Nutrition; hydration; death; dying; palliative care. practice of palliative care can accommodate Dr Craig's concerns (2) . The sensitivities and consultative process of negotiation which she articulates are well heard, and we believe are already embodied in contemporary palliative care practice.
There is a broad consensus on aims and ethics of palliative care, and an internationally agreed WHO definition (4) , although some diversity of clinical practice and ethical argument has emerged, particularly with regard to the relationship between palliative care and euthanasia (5, 6 ). This article is written from the perspective of an inpatient hospice unit which functions as the acute/crisis intervention facility for a comprehensive palliative-care network (hospital, hospice, home). There are no set policies about who may be admitted, and there is no arbitrary requirement for any therapeutic intervention to be stopped prior to admission. Many patients, particularly those who are young, or have haematological malignancies or AIDS, are in real need of hospice care for symptom control, respite or terminal care. However, they are not yet ready to stop having chemotherapy, blood transfusions, antibiotics or other so-called 'active' treatments with palliative intent, and AHA would certainly come under this category in our institution. A gradual process of negotiation will allow the cessation or non-initiation of treatment as the person's condition deteriorates. We agree that abrupt revision of treatment goals, particularly without adequate consultation of patient, family and staff will lead to anger and disharmony which may have lasting adverse consequences. Consequently communication with these persons is required, but it does not mean that the patient is treated in order to comfort the relatives. The issues raised by Dr Craig are discussed under two main headings: clinical, and ethical/legal.
Clinical
Dr Craig acknowledges the high public esteem for hospice and palliative care but goes on to state that 'some doctors have reservations'. The grounds for these are that there is a danger of patients being labelled as 'terminal' by the therapeutically inactive (palliative care) doctor. They may then be denied life-saving medical treatment which would be administered in the same situation by a treatmentorientated physician, perhaps for a wholly or partially reversible condition which has been misdiagnosed. Wilkes acknowledges that this is a real but rare eventuality, which does not occur more than a few times in a professional lifetime of palliative care practice (7) , and probably no more so than in any other domain of medical practice. Dr Craig cites two case histories where patients were assessed as dying, but were rehydrated and survived. These constitute poor evidence for mistaken Three phases Dr Craig quotes from an article in which we described an approach based on three phases of a life-threatening incurable illness: curative, palliative and terminal, with different aims and levels of treatment-related morbidity being acceptable in each phase (2) . A similar approach has been described for patients with cancer, for the purpose of making not for resuscitation orders (8) . We stated that in the terminal phase 'no form of artificial hydration or alimentation is undertaken, all measures not required for comfort are withdrawn, and no treatment-related toxicity is acceptable' (8) .
The framework we proposed was not intended to be a rigid and arbitrary 'policy', and we would not make a virtue of death without artificial hydration (in particular), as in some situations it might even be necessary for comfort right up until the time of death. We agreed that our model is ambiguous as presently worded, and should be amended by the addition of the following: ' (10) . This hopefully obviates any need for the practice, described by Wilkes, of infusing tap water into the rectum, especially if this practice is instituted to appease relatives (7).
In our view Dr Craig's real concerns are ethical and legal rather than clinical, and are based on a belief that medicine has a duty always to prevent death. This preoccupation with 'buying time' suggests a belief that doctors are responsible for death unless they do all possible to sustain life in all circumstances, a situation that Callahan calls 'technological brinkmanship': 'doctors still do not, as a rule, talk comfortably and directly with patients about death.... A worry about malpractice, a zest for technology, a deep-seated moral belief in the need to prolong life, and the pressure of families and others still often lead to overtreatment and an excessive reliance on technology' (11) .
Such an approach may have unfortunate consequences for medical practice, and is in part responsible for the difficulties which many doctors experience with appropriate treatment abatement for dying people. If the care of dying people is to improve in all its settings, we need to try and address the issue of non-provision of AHA as a cause of death, which was raised by Dr Craig as there appears to be considerable confusion both within the medical and nursing professions, and also for many members of the public.
Ethical and legal
There is now a broad consensus that AHA should be regarded as medical treatment (12) , and Beauchamp and Childress refer unequivocally to medically administered nutrition and hydration (MN&H) (13 given to all patients unless it is medically impossible to provide them. The term 'assisted feeding' is adopted to describe all provision of nutrition and hydration, and this is characterised as different from other medical treatments on the grounds that death inevitably results from non-provision; less skilled expertise is required to carry it out (tubes become passive conduits); and it is 'natural'. Assisted feeding is deemed to be always morally required, and moreover it is argued that this provides an acceptable objective moral standard which can stand firm against other more subjective morally unacceptable standards and tests that might be used in treatment abatement. In short, this stance is seen as a necessary safeguard against the so-called slippery slope to morally unacceptable withholding of treatment, with the wider attendant societal effects which might ensue from AHA abatement.
A litany of suffering is listed as a consequence of starvation and dehydration, with no mention of the effects of the underlying condition. The palliative care experience has simply not been like this, and there is no basis for believing that patients receiving palliative care are dying whilst suffering from symptoms of starvation and dehydration (13) , which would be lessened or abolished by the routine provision of AHA. We agree that continual review of symptomcontrol profiles of patients in palliative care services is necessary -with changes in treatment where necessary, including the provision of AHA (10) .
For a potentially reversible condition, and for people with incurable conditions who are not yet dying, artificial hydration and alimentation (AHA) is a medical treatment which must be offered. For incompetent persons with irreversible brain damage, the decision to cease AHA should depend on any available evidence of prior wishes of the person, and where such evidence is not available or is unclear, on their best interests, and not on a preconceived position on the obligatoriness of AHA. Nearly all the legal deliberations on the provision or withholding of AHA have been for people in this category. As Dr Craig states, the issue of AHA abatement for dying persons has not been specifically tested in the courts of the United Kingdom, and the most relevant recent legal deliberations are those in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (12) . Tony Bland was not dying, but was irrefutably in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) from which no prospect of recovery was deemed possible, by all but one dissenting piece of medical evidence (23) . The judgment of the House of Lords permitted the discontinuation of AHA, which was acknowledged to be his life support, on the grounds that since it was not in his best interests (because he no longer had an interest in being alive owing to an absence of higher cognitive function) there was no duty to continue this treatment. Bland cannot be directly extrapolated to the case of dying people, as they may well be sensate until the moment of death, and often will have both an interest in being alive and the means to express that interest. Nonetheless, the deliberative process in the Bland case has been helpful to all who study decision-making at the end of life, although the court's emphasis on the actomission distinction, with respect, may have been excessive (24) ; and if the patient's best interests are identified as the main concern, the problem still remains of who determines them -it can be argued that there was an over-reliance on (25) .
In other words, in each of the three sets of circumstances represented by these statements of the commission, there is no legal duty on the physician to initiate or to continue to provide useless treatment, or that which is refused by a competent person.
A court in New Zealand authorised withdrawal of ventilation from a man rendered incompetent anid completely paralysed by an extreme form of the Guillain-Barre syndrome. In this case, Justice Thomas throws light on what might be termed 'useless' with regard to medical care: 'Medical science and technology has advanced for a fundamental purpose: the purpose of benefiting the life and health of those who turn to medicine to be healed. It surely was never intended that it be used to prolong biological life in patients bereft of the prospect of returning to an even limited exercise of human life. Nothing in the inherent purpose of these scientific advances can require doctors to treat the dying as if they were curable. Natural death has not lost its meaning or significance. It may be deferred, but it need not be postponed indefinitely' (26) .
Gillon suggests that, where the negotiation and communication process has broken down, a mediation process should exist for situations involving differences of opinion about whether a person with a terminal illness should receive AHA (27) . This may be useful in very difficult situations, where referral to an institutional ethics committee or bioethical consultant may also help. It is to be hoped that this need can usually be avoided by the sensitive and appropriate raising of the issues addressed in this paper. Due regard is, however, required for the cultural and ethnic dimensions involved. Families who feel that they are neglecting their role and duty in the provision of nourishment will not appreciate having a discussion about the ethical or legal issues raised in relation to treatment abatement. They are, however, much more likely to agree to a care plan which is gently worked out with them, where all parties agree on their common values concerning the comfort, value and integrity of the person who is dying, and the absence of anyone's responsibility for that dying.
In conclusion, we believe that the approach which we have described here is the dominant one in modern palliative care practice, and is accepted in the mainstream of contemporary ethical discourse. We agree with Beauchamp and Childress who see: c... no reason to believe that medically administered nutrition and hydration is always an essential part of palliative care or that it necessarily constitutes, on balance, a beneficial medical treatment' (13) .
